Saving MacArthur:












The Wisdom of holding on to the Med:











The Ultimate Betrayal:














When I first started looking into the story of General General Douglas MacArthur and his struggle to defend the Philippines in 1941/42 I got much the feeling as when I first discovered the subject of Operation Sealion (Unternehmen Seelöwe), the German plan for invading England in September 1940. Many of the conclusions, as I see them, are based on rather subjective opinions, little research - with the result that the poor General is usually made a scapegoat. Like Admiral Kimmell and General Short were in the case of Pearl Harbor. 

That the American and Filipino forces at the Philippines were left high and dry after the Japanese assault on Dec. 8th 1941 is somewhat of a scandal that has been nicely covered over by the phrase; "It was of no use, it was not possible". To come to their relief, that is. 

Looking coldly at it the US leadership seemed to lose their heads completely after the first Japanese assaults in December 1941. This clouded their judgement for a long time. I base this on the fact that pre-war US military analysis indicated that the initial Japanese operations were actually far above their capabilities. In other words, they were over-stretching themselves. As history has revealed, this was correct.

This, coupled with the US giving priority to supporting their ABDA partners instead of going all out for relieving the Philippines, led to the Philippine downfall. My project is to show what could have happened if the US leadership - 1) Had not lost their heads, and 2) Had given priority to the relief of the Philippines instead of wasting their resources in other parts of the Dutch East Indies and the British colonies. The result is quite interesting.

Go to: Saving MacArthur


Most Italian military leaders were of the opinion that the invasion of Malta should be the first step taken by Italy if it ever entered into war with Great Britain. Mussolini, however, expected a short war and did not give priority to Malta. It was as grave a mistake for Mussolini as it was for Hitler not to invade England. What if Italy had decided to invade Malta? What where their plans, what were their chances, in what condition was the Malta defense. I am working on it....


Malta's fate, for a large part, hang on that of Gibraltar. The peninsula fortress had been in the hands of the British since early 18th. century, once it was seen as inpenetrable. In 1940 its military installallations were on its lowest ebb with no operational fighter airfield, a prerequisite in the modern warfare. Hitler was pressing Franco, the Spanish dictator, for a free ride through Spain to demolish Gibraltar. The French, during the Armistice negotiations in the summer of 1940, had suggested openings for Axis use of their bases in North Africa. What were Hitler and Mussolini's plans for Gibraltar, which where the Axis possibilities to conquer it? Was it necessary? I am working on that, too...


When Italy entered into the war, with France soundly defeated shortly thereafter, the British had a difficult decision to make. Should they stand to fight in the Mediterranean or use their precious naval resources elsewhere? The German U-boat fleet was just getting into gear in the Atlantic. Would the victorious German troops in France settle down there or make a Kraftsammlung to invade the UK.

Without the support of the modern French fleet the Royal Navy feared the equally modern Italian fleet would be too much for them in the Mediterranean. Considering the fact that, after the war, the struggle with the Italian military is often described as a walk-over by British sources one may ask what were their expected losses if their darkest fears had come true. Actually, when looking at it critically, and not only with British sources, the Italians gave as good as they got.

The British sea supplies to Australia, the Far and Middle East and their colonies there was rerouted already before Italy entered the war. So, what was the benefits of all the sacrifices? With their constant lack of fuel the Italian Navy could hardly have made any serious raids out of the Mediterranean area.

These three projects could be absolved into one with special focus on Malta and Gibraltar.......we shall see...


This project concerns the British conduct during the German onslaught on the Netherlands, Belgium and France and is a little farther off.

I first started to question mark this period after reading a book written by Brigadier-General Spears. He was Churchill's special envoy to Paul Reynaud and, as such, very much in the center of the events taking place in France during the early Summer of 1940. Thereafter I, quite incidentally, came across a book collection of six books previously owned by a member of Lord Gort's, Commanding Officer of the British Expeditionary Force in France, family (Vereker). Notes and markings in these books points to certain conclusions as to how the British played their game to get away from their martial obligations towards France.

Gereral Weygand, the French commander during the final period of France's struggle, is somewhat subdued on the subject, not unexpected considering his position after the war. He was in much the same position as the German leaders that survived Nürnberg. To cut it short - I think that what I have found can well justify a book title called: The Ultimate Betrayal.

To me, who has been breast-fed with the events taking place in Norway in the Spring and Summer of 1940, this is not at all such an improbable allegation. While it may not be generally known, France can have been betrayed by the British in the same manner as Norway was. Not that the British gave up in France, but the way they did it and the way they later disguised it all, putting the blame wholly on their ally, the French.  

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